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The rate of saving in the ,United  States has declined dramatically in recent 
decades.  Since 1980,  the U.S.  net national saving rate has averaged just 4 
percent.  Since 1990,  it has averaged just 2.4  percent-one-quarter  the mean 
rate observed in the 1950s and 60s.  This paper develops a unique cohort data 
set to study the decline in U.S.  national saving.  It decomposes postwar 
changes in  U.S. saving into those due to changes in cohort-specific consump- 
tion propensities,  those due to changes in the intergenerational distribution 
of resources, those due to changes in the rate of government consumption,  and 
those due to demographic changes. 
Our findings are striking.  The decline in  U.S. saving can be traced to one 
major factor: The redistribution of resources from young and unborn genera- 
tions with low or zero consumption propensities toward older generations with 
high consumption propensities.  Most of the redistribution  to the elderly 
reflects the growth in Social Security,  Medicare,  and Medicaid benefits. 
Although older generations' propensities to consume have increased 
significantly,  those of younger generations have declined or remained constant 
over the last three decades.  The increase in older Americans' consumption 
propensities may also reflect government policy,  namely, the fact that Social 
Security benefits come in the form of annuities and that Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits are provided to the elderly directly in the form of consumption of 
medical goods and services. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI. Introduction 
In 1950,  the U.S. rate of net national saving was 12.3  percent.  In  1993, 
it was only 2.7 percent.1  The difference in these saving rates illustrates a 
dramatic long-term decline in U.S. saving.  The national saving rate averaged 
9.1  percent per year in the 1950s and 1960s,  8.5  percent in the 1970s,  4.7 
percent in the 80s,  and just 2.4 percent in the first four years of the 1990s. 
The decline in  U.S. saving has been associated with an equally dramatic 
decline in U.S. domestic investment.  Since 1990,  net domestic investment  has 
averaged 3.1 percent per year,  compared with 8.2  percent in the 1950s, 
7.9 percent in the 1960s and 1970s,  and 6.1  percent in the 1980s.  The low 
rate of domestic investment has limited growth in labor productivity and, 
consequently,  growth in real wages.  Since 1980,  labor productivity has grown 
at less than half the rate observed between 1950 and 1979,  and total real 
compensation (wages  plus fringe benefits) per hour has grown at only one- 
eighth its previously observed rate. 
This paper develops a unique cohort data base to study the decline in 
U.S. saving.  A  key feature of these data is that they are bench-marked 
against national income accounts and other economic aggregates.  Consequently, 
they relate directly to the change in net national saving measured by national 
income accounts.  We use these cohort data within a simple life-cycle  frame- 
work to decompose postwar changes in U.S. saving into those due to changes in 
the intergenerational distribution of resources,  cohort-specific consumption 
propensities,  the rate of government spending,  and demographics. 
Our findings are striking.  Most of the decline in U.S. saving can  be 
traced to one major factor: a redistribution of resources toward older genera- 
l  The net national saving rate is defined as net national product less 
national consumption (household consumption  plus government purchases), 
divided by net national product. 
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not yet born),  with low or zero propensities to consume.  Much of the 
redistribution to the elderly appears to reflect the growth in government 
transfer payments.  Older Americans' propensities to consume privately 
purchased as well as government-provided goods and services have increased 
tremendously.  However, those of younger generations have exhibited an 
offsetting decline.  As a result,  despite the dramatic increase in the elderly 
cohorts' consumption  propensities, the shift in cohort consumption 
propensities alone may not have led to the decline in saving witnessed over 
the last three decades. 
This paper continues in Section I1 with a brief discussion of related 
research.  Section I11 presents some stylized facts about recent trends in 
U.S. saving and consumption.  Section IV describes our method for decomposing 
changes in national saving..  Section V discusses data construction  and data 
sources in general terms,  relegating details to the Appendix.  Section VI 
presents our findings, and Section VII draws conclusions. 
11. Related Studies 
Several recent studies of U.S. saving focus on  Americans' personal 
saving,  defined as saving out of disposable income.  Summers and Carroll 
(1987) suggest that younger cohorts may be hoping to rely on Social Security 
benefits in their retirement and are consequently saving too little on their 
own.  In contrast,  Bosworth,  Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) compare personal 
saving rates in the 1960s,  1970s,  and 1980s and conclude that all age groups 
The form taken by government transfers--the fact that they are 
annuitized and, in the case of health care,  are in kind-may  help explain the 
dramatic rise in elderly Americans' consumption propensities. 
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conclusion.  He places the blame for current low levels of personal saving on 
the failure of a particular subset of cohorts--those born between 1925 and 
1939-to  save. 
The studies by Bosworth et al. and Attanasio use consumer expenditure 
data which directly cover only 80 percent of aggregate consumption.  Although 
Bosworth et al. impute some missing consumption  components, they ignore health 
care,  as does Attanasio.  This is a significant omission.  Health care is a 
large and growing component of national consumption.  Moreover, as medical 
consumption  has grown as a share of output,  so too has overall consumption. 
This suggests that medical consumption,  or at least its method of finance,  may 
play a key role in the decline in the U.S. rate of saving. 
Even were all studies of personal saving in agreement, it would be hard 
to assess their implications for national saving.  From a theoretical perspec- 
tive,  personal saving bears no necessary relationship to national saving. 
This point can be understood by considering the standard life-cycle model 
under certainty.  According to this model, the appropriate measure of 
household saving is the propensity of households to consume out of the present 
value of their remaining lifetime resources.  This propensity will be 
invariant to present-value neutral changes in the timing of after-tax income 
flows,  each of which will produce a different value of personal saving. 
For example, an increase in households' current Social Security taxes 
that is offset,  in present value,  by higher projected Social Security benefits 
will leave their consumption and,  thus,  national saving unchanged,  but lower 
their personal saving.  The postwar period has witnessed enormous growth in 
Social Security and other government transfer programs.  Hence,  changes over 
time in U.S. personal saving rates could simply reflect the life-cycle pattern 
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household consumption and saving behavior. 
The problem with studying national saving via personal saving is actually 
deeper than this discussion suggests.  The reason is that the tax and transfer 
labels of government receipts and expenditure programs are not unique (see, 
for example,  Kotlikoff [1993]).  Assuming agents are rational,  the same fiscal 
policy can  be relabeled in countless ways with no impact on economic outcomes, 
including national saving.  But each relabeling will result in a different 
measure of personal saving.  For example,  suppose the U.S. government had 
historically labeled Social Security contributions as "loans" to the govern- 
ment rather than as "taxes" and current and past Social Security benefit 
payments as "repayment of past loans,  plus an old-age tax" rather than as 
"transfer  payments.~~  Doing so would have produced an entirely different 
postwar reported path of personal saving,  but it would not have altered 
national saving,  assuming rational consumption and saving behavior.  In 1993, 
for example, the measured personal saving rate would have been almost three 
times larger than the rate the government actually reported! 
Studies that focus directly on household consumption and,  by implica- 
tion,  national saving are few and far between.  Cutler et al. (1990) is one 
example.  This study employs an infinite-horizon model to study the response 
of  household consumption to demographic change.  Its findings suggest that 
high rates of household consumption and low rates of national saving may 
Such relabeling is not simply a hypothetical possibility.  The so- 
called "privatization"  of the Chilean social security system amounts, in large 
part, simply to relabeling workers' social security contributions as loans 
rather than as taxes.  Under the Chilean "reform,"  workers contribute to 
pension funds.  But the pension funds turn around and lend most of these 
contributions to  the government,  which uses them to make benefit payments to 
current Social Security recipients. 
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arising from the aging of the U.S.  population.  However, there are two 
critical difficulties with this analysis.  First, the assumed intergenera- 
tional altruism underlying the infinite-horizon model is strongly rejected by 
household and cohort panel data (see Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff [1992]; 
Abel and Kotlikoff [1994];  and Hayashi,  Altonji, and Kotlikoff [1994]). 
Second, the study's results are highly sensitive to the assumption about the 
economy's  initial position (that is,  whether it is initially in a steady 
state.  ) 
Boskin and Lau (1988a and 1988b) estimate an aggregate consumption 
function taking into account aggregation  over different cohorts.  Their 
results suggest that a decline in saving by generations born after the Great 
Depression is largely responsible for the postwar decline in U.S. saving--a 
finding at odds with those reported here.  Boskin and Lau's  methodology 
differs significantly from our approach, so it is hard to say precisely why 
the two studies reach such different conclusions. 
111. The Postwar Decline in U.S.  Saving--Some Stylized Facts 
Table 1 reports average values of the net national saving rate for the 
1950s,  1960s,  1970s,  and 1980s,  as well as the first four years of the 1990s. 
The net national saving rate is defined as (Y-C-G)/Y,  where Y refers to net 
national product, C to household consumption,  and G to government spending 
(purchases of goods and services).  The table also reports rates of government 
and household consumption out of output,  G/Y and C/Y.  In addition,  it reports 
our preferred measure of private-sector saving,  which we call the household 
saving rate.  It's  defined as (Y-G-C)/(Y-G)--the  share saved of the output 
left over to the household sector after the government has consumed (that is, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe share of Y-G  that is not consumed by the public).  Unlike the personal 
saving rate,  the household saving rate isn't affected by present-value neutral 
changes in the timing of income flows.  Nor is it altered by pure changes in 
the labeling of government receipts and expenditures,  assuming agents are 
rational and aren't deceived by the government's choice of words. 
As Table 1 indicates,  government spending is not responsible for reducing 
the rate of national saving.  Indeed,  the rate of government spending,  G/Y, 
has declined since the 1970s.  Furthermore,  government spending in the 1990s 
has averaged just 21 percent of output-as  low a rate as any observed in the 
five periods.  The rate of household consumption spending,  on the other hand, 
rose from 69.9 percent of output in the 1950s to 76.5  percent in the early 
1990s.  This increased rate of household consumption was associated with a 
decline in the household saving rate from 11.5  percent in the 1950s to 
3.1 percent in the 1990s. 
Table 2 considers the role of health-care spending in the growth of 
household spending.  It shows that medical expenditures  have increased from 
3.9 percent of NNP in the 1950s to 12.8  percent in the 1990s.  In the 1950s 
health-care spending represented less than 6 percent of household consumption. 
So far,  in the 1990s,  it has represented almost 17 percent.  The increase in 
the rate of medical spending was associated with only a modest reduction in 
the rate of nonmedical spending.  In the 1950s,  nonmedical consumption 
averaged 66 percent of NNP.  In the 1990s,  it averaged 63.7 percent.  Thus, 
although the rate of medical consumption  rose by 8.9 percentage points between 
the 1950s and 1990s,  the rate of nonmedical consumption fell by only 2.3 
percentage points. 
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We adopt the life-cycle model under certainty as our framework for 
decomposing postwar changes in national saving.  In so doing,  we don't mean to 
belittle other determinants of saving,  such as uncertainty and the desire to 
bequeath.  Rather,  we believe that this model is a useful place to begin 
investigating the decline in  U.S. saving.  We also suspect that the findings 
reported here will carry over to more realistic models of saving. 
Our interest is in the net national saving rate,  which, at time t,  is 
given by 
where St stands for net national saving. 
In the standard life-cycle model with certainty and homothetic prefer- 
ences,  each cohort's consumption is proportional to the present value of its 
remaining lifetime resources (resources for short).  We denote the per capita 
resources of cohort age i at time t as rit.  This is the sum of the cohort's 
per capita net wealth,  nwit,  its per capita present value of future labor 
earnings (human wealth),  hwit,  its per capital present value of private and 
government employee pension benefits (their pension wealth),  pwit,  less its 
per capita present value of future tax payments net of the per capita present 
value of future transfer payments received (their generational accounts), 
gait. 
Since our empirical analysis attributes all consumption to adult cohorts 
age 18 through 100,  we write aggregate consumption at time t as the sum of 
consumption of individual cohorts4 age 18 through 100,  that is,  as 
Cohorts older than 100  years are grouped together with those age 100. 
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where i indexes age,  ait  stands for the average propensity to consume of i 
year olds at time t,  and Pi,t  represents the number of persons who are i years 
old at time t.  We note for future reference that ait  = cit/rit, where cit is 
the average level of consumption of those age i at time t. 
Our goal is to decompose changes over time in the net national saving 
rate into changes in the rate of government spending,  Gt/Yt, and changes in 
determinants of the rate of household spending,  Ct/Yt.  These determinants are 
clarified by expressing the rate of household spending as 
where Rt stands for the time-t  total value of resources of living generations 
(that is,  Rt=Ciritpit), Pt stands for the total population at time t,  and rt 
stands for the time-t resources per capita of living generations. 
According to (3),  changes over time in the rate of household consumption 
can  be traced to changes over time in four factors: cohort-specific 
propensities to consume (the sits), the shape of the age-resource profile (the 
rit/rts),  the age composition of the population (the Pit/Pts),  and the 
resource-output ratio-the  ratio of total resources of current generations to 
current output (Rt/Yt). 
In our empirical analysis we compute the values of five factors-the 
above four plus government spending--for each of four time periods: 1960-61, 
1972-73, 1984-86, and 1987-90.  We then consider how the national saving rate 
in  each of these periods would have differed had one of the five factors not 
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periods. 
This decomposition of changes in life-cycle saving into those due to 
changes in demographics,  saving behavior,  and age-resource profiles has a long 
tradition dating to Ando and Modigliani (1963).  Their lessons bear repeating. 
First, increases in any cohort's propensity to consume will,  all else being 
equal, raise the rate of aggregate household spending and lower national 
saving.  Second,  higher rates of population or real wage growth mean higher 
rates of national saving for the following simple reason: In  the life-cycle 
model, the propensity to consume is predicted to rise with age.  Since popula- 
tion and real wage growth raise the respective values of the Pit/Pt and rit/rt 
ratios for younger cohorts and lower them for older cohorts,  such growth 
produces a reweighting of sits, which reduces the rate of household spending 
and raises the rate of national saving. 
The final lesson is that redistribution across generations can alter 
national saving by altering the age-resource profile, the resource-output 
ratio,  or both.  Government tax/transfer policy can,  of course,  produce such 
redistribution.  Consider government redistribution among living generations- 
specifically, from the young to the old at time t--that  leaves the resource- 
output ratio unchanged.  Such redistribution is accomplished by raising the 
present value of taxes net of transfers of young generations (their genera- 
tional accounts) and reducing the present value of taxes net of transfers of 
older generations while leaving unchanged the net tax burden facing current 
generations collectively.  This policy lowers the values of the rit/rts of the 
young and raises them for the old.  This raises the weights applied to rela- 
tively high values of ait and reduces those applied to relatively low values, 
producing a higher rate of aggregate household spending. 
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raises the resource-output ratio but leaves the age-resource profile 
unchanged.  This can be accomplished by reducing the generational accounts of 
each current generation  by just the amount needed to produce the same 
percentage increase in its remaining lifetime resources.  This policy raises 
the rate of household spending  by an amount that depends on the resource- and 
population-weighted economy-wide propensity to consume (the bracketed term in 
equation [3]). 
V. Data Construction and Sources 
To decompose changes across our four periods in national saving,  we need 
the value for each period of the five factors mentioned earlier.  Two  of these 
factors-the  rate of government spending and the age composition  of the 
population--are  readily available.  This is not the case for the value of the 
tits or the rip,  both of which are needed to form the sits.  The rits  are 
also needed to form the age-resource profile and the resource-output ratio. 
Our procedures for calculating the cits and rits are described in detail 
in the Appendix.  Briefly,  we form these variables or their constituent 
components by using cross-section profiles and population data to distribute 
aggregate variables by age and sex.  Our general method of distributing an 
aggregate variable in time t,  say Zt,  can be understood by considering the 
following equation: 
In  equation (4), zm40t  stands for the average value of Z  of 40-year-old males 
at time t,  vmit and vfit stand,  respectively,  for the ratios of average values 
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respectively,  for the populations of males and females age i in year t.  Given 
the value of Zt  from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) or other 
sources,  the relative age-sex profile of Z  (the vmits and vfits) calculated 
from a cross-section survey,  and the Pmits  and Pfits calculated from popula- 
tion data,  we can use equation (5) to solve for zm40t.  We can then multiply 
this value by vmit (vfit) to determine zmit (zfit)-the  average value of Z  for 
males (females) age i in year t.  Finally,  we can form a population-weighted 
average of zmit  and zfit to produce an average value of Z  for age group i at 
time t. 
In the case of the tits, we use the 1961-62, 1972-73, 1984-86, and 1987- 
1990 Consumer Expenditure Surveys and the 1977 and 1987 National Medical 
Expenditure Surveys to form relative profiles of total consumption  by age and 
sex.  By total consumption,  we mean all components of household consumption 
that are included in the NIPA aggregate, including medical care and imputed 
rent on owner-occupied housing.  In the process of forming these profiles, we 
had to allocate CEX household expenditures to individual adult members in the 
household.  In so doing,  we first allocated expenditures to all members of the 
household, including children,  and then allocated children's expenditures to 
parents residing with them.  Certain allocations were quite obvious, such as 
children's clothing.  In other cases,  we adopted what we believe to be 
reasonable rules,  which are described in the Appendix.  The age-sex relative 
consumption  profiles for the four periods derived in these calculations are 
used, together with period-specific Social Security counts of population by 
age and sex,  to distribute NIPA values of aggregate household consumption in 
each of the four periods. 
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annuitized and nonannuitized resources.  We form each of the components of the 
rits separately and then add them.  By annuitized resources we mean the 
present values of future labor earnings (human wealth),  Social Security 
benefits, private and government employee pension benefits,  government health- 
care benefits,  welfare benefits and other government transfers,  and,  entering 
as negative annuities, the present values of future taxes.  Taxes include 
labor and capital income taxes,  indirect taxes,  payroll taxes,  and property 
and other taxes.  Nonannuitized resources refers simply to holdings of net 
wealth. 
The computation  of cohorts' nonannuitized resources for the four periods 
involves distributing by age and sex each year's aggregate value of household 
net wealth and then averaging over the years defining the four periods.  The 
computation of each annuitized resource component is more involved.  First, 
for each year between 1960 and 1993,  the national aggregate for a particular 
type of payment (or receipt) is distributed by age and sex according to the 
cross-section, age-sex relative profile that is applicable to that payment (or 
receipt).  For example,  aggregate 1965 Social Security benefits are distrib- 
uted according to the age-sex relative profile for these benefits in 1965. 
This yields estimates of the per capita amounts of the payment (or receipt) by 
age and sex for that year.  The per capita annuity values for years after 1993 
are estimated by either 1)  distributing projected aggregate payments or 
receipts according to the latest available cross-section relative profile or 
2)  assuming that age- and sex-specific per capita values equal their respec- 
tive values in 1993 or some later year,  except for an adjustment for produc- 
tivity growth. 
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future per capita payments of a particular type (say, indirect tax payments) 
is computed by multiplying these future per capita payments by the genera- 
tion's  projected population in those years,  discounting these values back to 
year t,  and dividing the sum of the discounted values by the number of members 
of the generation alive in the base year.  This method produces actuarially 
discounted present values of the particular receipt or payment for each gener- 
ation alive in period t.  We consider three pretax real discount rates: 
6 percent, 8  percent (our base case),  and 10  percent.  5 
As an example of this method for calculating the different components of 
annuitized resources,  consider our estimate of human wealth (HW).  Our formula 
for human wealth in year t of sex x born in year k,  HW~~,  k,  is 
where exsk  stands for the average earnings in year s of a member of the gener- 
ation born in year k and of sex x;  pXSk is the population in year s of the 
same-sex-specific generation,  R=l/(l+r),  where r is the rate of interest; and 
D is the maximum age reached.  The calculation of exsk is given by 
These rates bracket the pretax real rate of return observed, on 
average,  between 1961 and 1992,  where the rate of return in year t is calcu- 
lated as '[(NWt-Lt-Pt+Ct+Tt)/NWttl] - 1 and NWt is household net worth in 
period t,  Lt is aggregate labor income excluding contributions to private 
pension funds,  Pt is pension income including private pensions,  government 
employee pensions,  workers compensation and veterans benefits,  Ct is personal 
consumption expenditure,  and Tt is aggregate net tax payments. 
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in year s of the average earnings of the generation born in year k of sex x, 
divided by the average earnings in year s of our reference group-those  who 
were age 40 in year s (that is,  those for whom k=s-40). 
The construction of relative profiles by age and sex,  dxtk, is described 
in equations (7)  and (8): 
X 
Nk  x  x  w 
i=l  ski 'ski 
X 
2 
!Sk  X 
W  ski  i-1 
and 
In (7), jxsk  is the weighted average (across cohort members indexed by i)  of 
labor income.  N~~~ is the number of observations in year s of individuals of 
sex x born in year k,  jXski is the wage and salary income of the ith indi- 
vidual of sex x in year s who was born in year k,  and wxSki is the person 
weight of this observation.  Equation (8)  shows the calculation in year s of 
the average labor income of members of the generation belonging to sex x who 
were born in year k,  relative to that of contemporaneous 40-year-old males. 
The national aggregates used in our calculations come from the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA),  the Federal Reserve System's  Flow of 
Funds,  The American Council of Life Insurance,  the U.S. Census Bureau's 
Current Population Survey,  and the Survey of Current Business. The sources for 
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Participation, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES),  the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF),  the Social Security Administration's Annual Statistical 
Supplement,  and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).  The computa- 
tions also use the historic and projected population counts of the Social 
Security Administration. 
VI. Findings 
A. Lookine  -  at the Data 
Before decomposing past changes in the U.S. saving rate,  it's worth 
considering some of the data we've  constructed.  We begin with figures 1 and 2 
which show,  respectively,  relative profiles by age of total consumption and 
nonmedical consumption.  Each figure contains profiles for the periods 1960- 
61,  1972-73, 1984-86, and 1987-90.  The choice of periods was based on the 
availability of CES data.  For each period, the average consumption of 40- 
year-olds is normalized to 1. 
The figures document a remarkable increase in the relative consumption of 
the elderly.  This increase is more pronounced if medical care is included in 
the measure of consumption,  but the increase in the relative consumption of 
nonmedical goods and services is also striking.  Tables 3 and 4  examine some 
of the numbers underlying figures 1 and 2.  They report ratios of average 
levels of total as well as nonmedical consumption of 60-, 70-, and 80-year- 
olds to the respective levels of 20-, 30-, and 40-year-olds  for each of the 
four periods.  According to the tables, 70-year-olds  in 1960-61 consumed about 
71 percent of the amount consumed by 30-year-olds  in 1960-61, whereas their 
consumption now exceeds that of 30-year-olds by 18 percent.  In the case of 
nonmedical consumption,  70-year-olds  consumed about 63  percent of the amount 
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increase in consumption  by the elderly,  relative to other ages, is equally 
dramatic. 
The striking increase in the relative consumption of the elderly has 
coincided with an equally remarkable increase in their relative resources. 
Figure 3 depicts changes in the age distribution of resources (the rit/rts) 
across the four time periods.6  Table 5 presents the ratios of the average 
resources of persons aged 60,  70,  and 80  years to those aged 20,  30,  and 40 
years.  In 1960-61, the average resources of 70-year-olds were only 56 percent 
as large as those of 30-year-olds.  In 1987-90, they were 85 percent as large. 
The resources of other older cohorts have also grown significantly relative to 
those of younger cohorts over the past three decades. 
Figures 4  through 7 show the components of rit/rts: the human wealth 
ratio,  hwit/rt, nonhuman wealth ratio,  nwit/rt, pension wealth ratio,  pwit/rt, 
and generational account ratio,  gait/rt.  Figure 4  indicates a sizable decline 
in the human wealth ratio for young cohorts.  Indeed,  this decline accounts 
for most of the overall decline in rit/rt for young cohorts.  The reduction in 
the ratio of human wealth to resources at these ages is the result of a low 
projected rate of labor income growth compared to the 1960s and early 1970s.  7 
Figure 5 shows profiles of nwit/rt for the four periods.  Interestingly, 
although this ratio falls for all cohorts, it falls most precipitously for the 
The kinks at age 80 in figure 3 reflect our method of imputing 
relative nonhuman wealth for individuals age 80 and above.  The small number 
of  observations at these ages in the Survey of Consumer Finances precludes 
forming separate estimates of average nonhuman wealth at these ages.  Here,  we 
assume that the relative nonhuman  wealth of those 80 or older equals that of 
80-year-olds  of the same sex. 
Note that our base-case calculations assume a 0.75  percent annual 
growth in labor productivity. 
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almost all older cohorts,  despite a steep decline in their nonhuman  wealth 
ratio.  Figure 6 presents the ratio of pension wealth to resources,  pwit/rt, 
for each of the four periods.  As indicated,  cohorts of preretirement age 
experienced particularly rapid growth in pension wealth over the last three 
decades.  The increase in pwit/rt  accounts for a sizable part of the increase 
in rit/rt  for these cohorts. 
Figure 7 shows changes over time in the ratios of generational accounts 
to resources.  Note that all cohorts experienced declines in gait/rts between 
the early 1960s and late 1980s.  However, the reductions are much larger for 
cohorts aged 55 and older.  In 1960-61, for example,  the present value of net 
transfers to 70-year-olds  amounted to 4  percent of per capita resources.  In 
the late 1980s,  the corresponding figure was about 25 percent.  Changes in 
generational accounts are clearly responsible for most of the rise in the 
relative resources of the elderly in the postwar period. 
Figure 8 graphs age-specific consumption  propensities in each of the four 
periods.  In  each period, the propensity to consume is roughly constant prior 
to about age 60  and then rises steadily.  There is a local peak between ages 
35 and 45 in the graphs that appears to reflect household expenditures on 
child rearing.  Note that this local peak occurs at later ages through time-a 
result that is consistent  with the trend of parents having children  at older 
ages  . 
The most notable feature of figure 8,  however, is that it documents a 
very substantial increase over time in the consumption propensities of older 
Americans.  Take 80-year-olds, for example,  whose propensity to consume rose 
from 8.7 percent in 1960-61 to 12.7 percent in 1987-90.  Interestingly,  there 
is  no corresponding increase in the consumption propensities of the young and 
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propensities of the older old have risen and that those of the young and 
middle-aged have remained relatively constant--are  robust to different assumed 
values of the discount rate.  At a discount rate of 3 percent, for example, 
80-year-olds'  consumption propensity rises from 8.5  percent in 1960-61 to 
11.5  percent in 1987-90 (see figure 9).  At a discount rate of 9 percent, it 
rises from 8.9 to 13.8 percent. 
Finally,  consider figure 10,'  which shows changes over the four periods in 
the age composition of the U.S. population.  The figure indicates a small rise 
since the early 1960s in the share of the population over age 65.  It also 
indicates that there were relatively more adults in their twenties and 
thirties in the late 1980s than in the early 1960s,  and relatively fewer 
adults in their forties and fifties. 
B. Decomvosin~  Postwar Chan~es  in U.S. Saving 
Tables 7-12 examine the effect on U.S. saving of changes in the five 
factors mentioned above: the age distribution of resources, the resource- 
output ratio,  R/NNP, propensities to consume, the age distribution  of the 
population,  and the rate of government spending (G/NNP).  Except tables 9 and 
12,  which consider the effects of changes in the age composition of the popu- 
lation and the rate of government spending,  each table shows results for real 
discount rates of 3,  6,  and 9 percent. 
1  . Changes in the Age-Resource  Distribution 
Consider first the middle panel of table 7,  which incorporates our base- 
case 6 percent real discount rate.  In this panel, as well as all the other 
panels in tables 7-12, the numbers along the diagonal are the actual rates of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmU.S. net national saving that were observed in the periods being studied.  The 
off-diagonal numbers indicate the saving rate that would have been observed in 
the row period had the saving factor in question (in this case,  the age 
distribution of resources) taken the column period's value. 
Take the first number in the last row,  5.12,  as an example.  This is the 
saving rate that,  all else being equal,  would have been observed in 1987-90 
had the age-resource distribution been the same then as it was in 1960-61. 
Since 3.38 is the actual saving rate observed in 1987-90, we conclude that the 
saving rate for that period would have been 51 percent larger had the age- 
resource distribution of the late 1980s matched that of the early 1960s. 
A comparison of 5.23 (the last number in the first row of the central 
panel of table 7) with 7.85,  the actual 1960-61 saving rate,  provides another 
way to assess the importance of the change in the age-resource distribution. 
It shows that the saving rate would have been 33 percent smaller if everything 
else had remained as it was in 1960-61 but the age-resource distribution  had 
changed as it did over the three decades.  That is,  a change in the age 
resource distribution alone would have been sufficient to depress saving 
rates. 
The corner values in each panel of table 7 indicate that the shifts in 
the age-resource distribution among living generations is an important factor 
in  explaining the much lower actual rates of U.S. saving that occurred in the 
late 1980s than in the early 1960s.  But, as figure 3 shows, these age- 
resource profile changes did not occur overnight.  Indeed,  the other values of 
table 7 show that the shifting age-resource distribution has been responsible 
for a steady decline in national saving. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm2. Changes in Average Propensities to Consume 
Table 8 shows the effect on the national saving rate of changes over time 
in average propensities to consume.  The last number in the first column of 
the middle panel (2.10) indicates that,  other things being equal,  the 1987-90 
net national saving rate would have been 38 percent lower had 1987-90 consump- 
tion propensities equaled those of 1960-61.  This decrease in the saving rate 
may seem surprising,  given the much larger consumption propensities of elderly 
cohorts in 1987-90.  The reason for the decline becomes clear on a closer look 
at figure 8: Except for cohorts in their early 40s,  the consumption 
propensities of most younger cohorts are lower in the late 1980s than in the 
early 1960s.  The slightly higher consumption propensities of younger cohorts 
in the 1960-61 period produce a substantial negative effect on the saving rate 
because there are many more young individuals in the population than there are 
older ones,  and because the consumption  propensities of older persons were 
much lower in 1960-61 than in 1987-90.  The last number in the first row of 
table 8 (9.46) shows that a change in cohort consumption propensities alone 
would have led to higher saving rates in the late 1980s. 
The conclusion that the steep increases in older generations' 
propensities to consume are more than offset by the declines in those of 
younger generations is robust for lower discount rates but not for higher 
ones.  A lower discount rate of 3 percent reduces the 1987-90 profile of 
consumption propensities by more than it lowers that for 1960-61, because the 
degree of annuitization of wealth is much greater,  especially for older 
cohorts in the late 1980s.  Hence,  as a comparison of figures 8 and 9 indi- 
cates,  using a 3 percent instead of a 6 percent discount rate produces a 
See Auerbach et al. (1994). 
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saving rate is even lower if the 1960-61 consumption  propensities profile is 
used in place of the 1987-90 profile.  The reverse argument holds for a higher 
discount rate.  Hence,  at a 9 percent interest rate,  the saving rate would 
have been larger had the 1960-61 consumption propensities prevailed in the 
1987-90 period. 
3.  Changes in the Population Distribution 
Table 9 shows the effect on  U.S. saving rates of changes over time in the 
age composition of the population.  As we have noted,  had the 1960-61 age 
distribution of the population prevailed in 1987-90, the U.S.  saving rate 
would have been 2.44 percent rather than 3.38  percent.  This result can be 
understood by recalling that the propensity to consume rises with age and,  as 
shown in figure 10,  the age distribution of the early 1960s featured rela- 
tively more middle-aged Americans and relatively fewer younger Americans than 
did the age distribution of the late 1980s. 
4. Changes in the Resources-Income  Ratio 
Table 10 shows the impact of changes over time in the ratio of resources 
to income.  The last number in the first column of the middle panel (8.34) 
indicates that saving rates would have been two and a half times as large if 
the 1960-61 R/NNP  ratio had prevailed in 1987-90.  Table 11 reports this ratio 
and its components for the four periods and for the three discount rates.  For 
the base case (r=6 percent),  R/NNP increased from 12.72 to 13.62 between 1960- 
61  and 1987-90.  An increase in this ratio raises the rate of consumption out 
of income and reduces the net national saving rate. 
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over time in the ratios of human and nonhuman  wealth to net national product 
(HW/NNP and NHW/NNP, respectively) are not responsible for the increase in 
R/NNP.  Rather, it is partially the increase in the ratio of pension wealth to 
income (PW/NNP),  but primarily the decline in the ratio of aggregate genera- 
tional accounts to income (GA/NNP),  that causes the rise.  In other words, the 
government's intergenerational redistribution of resources,  particularly the 
redistribution from future to living generations,  is primarily responsible for 
the increase in the resource-income ratio,  which, in turn,  appears to be the 
single most important cause of the decline in U.S. national saving. 
5. Changes  in the Government  Spending Rate 
Table 12 considers how changes in the government spending rate,  G/NNP, 
have affected national saving.  This rate fell slightly from 21.6 percent in 
1960-61 to 21.2 percent in 1987-90.  The numbers in the middle panel show that 
had G/NNP  in 1987-90 taken on its 1960-61 value, the 1987-90 U.S. saving rate 
would have been 12 percent smaller; in other words, the rate of government 
spending in the late 1980s is not responsible for the low rate of national 
saving during that period. 
6.  The  Case of No  Annuity Markets 
The foregoing discussion assumes that individuals can convert future 
income flows into currently disposable resources at actuarially fair discount 
rates-that  is,  the pretax rate of interest plus the probability of death 
conditional on age.  This is equivalent to assuming the existence of explicit 
or implicit actuarially fair annuity insurance.  To investigate the robustness 
of the results to this assumption,  we now consider the opposite assumption- 
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future flows under this assumption is simply the pretax rate of interest. 
Table 13 indicates that the no-annuity-insurance assumption does not 
materially affect the results of tables 7 through 12.'  Applying the 1960s' 
propensities to consume to the cohort-specific resource levels of the late 
1980s reduces the saving rate in the late 1980s from 3.4 percent to 2.42 
percent rather than to 2.10  percent as in the previous case.  The effects on 
national saving of switching the age-resource distribution and the resources- 
to-income ratio are almost identical to earlier cases: With the 1960-61 age- 
resource distribution,  the saving rate would have increased from 3.4 percent 
to 5.07 percent instead of to 5.12 percent.  Finally,  using the 1960-61 
resources-to-income ratio increases the saving rate from 3.4 percent to 8.09 
percent instead of to 8.34  percent as earlier. 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper traces the dramatic postwar decline in U.S.  saving to one main 
cause: government redistribution from young and as yet unborn generations to 
older ones.  Without this factor,  the current U.S. rate of national saving 
would be at least thrice as large.  The increase in the rate at which older 
generations consume their resources has been offset by the decline of younger 
generations' consumption  propensities.  However, the increase in the relative 
resources of older Americans has led to a remarkable increase in their 
relative consumption.  Today's  70-year-olds are consuming,  on average,  roughly 
one-fifth more than are 30-year-olds.  Were this the early 1960s,  they'd  be 
consuming only two-thirds as much.  The increase in the relative consumption 
All the results of table 13 use the base-case value of r=6 percent. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof the elderly remains dramatic, even if one considers only nonmedical 
consumption. 
The fact that propensities to consume are not systematically larger, 
indeed are smaller,  for most young and middle-aged  cohorts in the late 1980s 
than in the early 1960s indicates that "spendthrift"  young and middle-aged 
Americans are not to blame for the decline in  U.S. saving.  This is not to say 
that young and middle-aged Americans are saving enough.  Given the severe 
imbalance in long-run U.S. fiscal policy, they need to save significant sums 
simply to safeguard themselves against future tax increases or reductions in 
transfer payments (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1994). 
Since there is every reason to believe that U.S. intergenerational 
redistribution  will continue apace,  at least through the turn of this century, 
there is little doubt that U.S. saving rates will remain extremely low or 
decline even further.  Anemic U.S. saving rates will spell anemic rates of 
U.S. domestic investment,  labor productivity growth,  and real wage growth. 
This is the unfortunate legacy of the uncontrolled intergenerational 
redistribution that has been fueling ever higher rates of U.S. consumption. 
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Labor  Income 
Aggregate  labor  income between  1960 and  1993 is calculated as labor's share of 
NIPA-reported  national income.  For  each of  these years, labor's share of 
national income  is calculated under  the assumption that its share of  proprie- 
torship income  is the same  as its share of  national income. lo Relative 
profiles of  labor income  by  age  and  sex are calculated for each year between 
1963 and  1987 using that year's CPS  data.  The  1963 profile is  used  to 
distribute aggregate  labor income  for years prior to 1963, and  the 1987 
profile is applied for years after 1987.  Per capita labor income  for years 
beyond  1993 is projected under  the assumption  that, except for an adjustment 
for growth,  cohorts of  a given age and  sex earn the same  average labor income 
in future years as cohorts of  that age  and  sex earned in 1993.  For  example, 
males  who  are age 50  in 1994 assumed  to earn the same  amount  on  average,  apart 
from an adjustment  for growth,  as males  who  were  age 50  in 1993.  The  growth 
adjustment  is 1.2 percent per year.  Thus,  the projected average earnings of 
males  aged 50  in, say,  1996 equals the corresponding 1993 average for males 
aged 50,  multiplied by  (1.012)~. 
'O~he share of  labor. income  in  national income  is  a,  where  a  satisfies C 
+ aPI = aNI.  In this equation,  C  is compensation paid to employees  less 
employer  contributions to employee  pension plans,  PI is proprietorship  income, 
and NI is national income.  The  calculated values of  a  are quite stable over 
the period 1960-1992,  ranging between  0.76 and  0.82. 
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Pension benefits include private pension benefits,  workers compensation, 
veterans benefits, and government employee pension benefits.  Aggregate 
pension benefits for the years 1960-1988 are taken from Park (1992).  Here, 
the NIPA estimates are used primarily because estimates based upon administra- 
tive reports are generally deemed more reliable than those based upon 
household surveys.  The estimates for years after 1988 were derived by 
applying the average growth rate of real benefits between 1984  and 1988 to the 
1988 figure.  The aggregates for the other three types of benefits are taken 
from SCB. 
The relative profiles for all four types of pensions are computed from the 
March CPS.  This survey contains information on pension income from a variety 
of sources including company or union pensions,  workers compensation,  veterans 
benefits, and government employee pensions, and receipts from annuities and 
other regular contributions.  For all categories retirement,  disability,  and 
survivor benefits are included.  Separate profiles were obtained for each of 
the years between 1970 and 1992.  The 1970 profile was used to distribute the 
aggregates in years prior to 1970.  For years after 1992,  it is assumed that 
real average pension benefits at a given age and sex-equal  their 1992 values 
adjusted for our assumed 1.2 percent rate of growth. 
Social Securitv Benefits 
Aggregate Social Security benefits between 1960 and 1993 are those reported in 
the NIPA.  Between 1993 and 2030 we use the Office of Management and Budget's 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(OMB) projections (on a NIPA basis) of Social Security benefits.  Aggregate 
Social Security Old Age, Survivor,  and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits 
after 2030 equal the 2030 aggregate adjusted for growth.  The growth rates 
applied in this case are those embedded in a special Social Security Adminis- 
tration projection of total benefit payments for the years after 2030.  This 
projection incorporates Social Security's intermediate economic and 
demographic assumptions with one exception: The productivity growth rate is 
assumed to equal 1.2  percent. 
The SSASS reports average benefits by age and sex by type of benefit as well 
as the total number of recipients in each age-sex category.  These data were 
used to form population-weighted per capita OASDI benefit profiles by age and 
sex.  Relative profiles for OASDI benefits for each year from 1960 through 
1990 were obtained from that year's SSASS.  For years after 1990 we use the 
1990 relative profile of Social Security benefits by age and sex. 
Medicare and Medicaid Benefits 
Aggregate Medicare and Medicaid payments from the inception of these programs 
through 1993 are reported by NIPA.  OMB provided us with unpublished projec- 
tions (on a NIPA basis) of aggregate Medicare payments for the years 1994 
through 2030. In the case of Medicaid, we applied OMB's projected annual 
growth rates for grants in aid to state and local governments between 1994  and 
2030 to the 1993 aggregate NIPA value of Medicaid.  Beyond 2030,  both Medicare 
and Medicaid payments are assumed to grow in accordance with demographic 
change and our assumed productivity growth rate.  Relative profiles of 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits are based on HCFA data on average benefits by 
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year age  groups. 
Unemplovment  Insurance.  Aid  to Families with Dependent  Children,  Food  Stamps. 
and General Welfare Benefits 
Aggregate  values of  these federal, state, and  local transfers are reported by 
NIPA.  State and  local supplemental  security income  as well as transfers for 
employment  and  training are distributed according to the relative profile for 
AFDC.  General welfare benefits include  federal black-lung  benefits,  state 
general assistance, state energy assistance, education benefits,  and  other 
federal,  state, and  local transfers.  The  aggregate  amount  of  earned income- 
tax credit was  distributed according to the relative profile for food stamps. 
Profiles for unemployment  insurance,  food stamps, AFDC,  and general welfare 
are computed  from  the 1983 SIPP.  These  relative profiles were  used  to 
distribute their respective aggregate  expenditures for all of  the years 
between  1960 and  1993.  For  future years we  assume  that the age-  and sex- 
specific values of  each of  these types of  transfer payments  keep  pace with 
productivity growth. 
Labor  Income  Taxes 
Aggregate  federal, state, and  local income  taxes for 1960  through  1993 are 
reported in  NIPA.  For  1993 through  2030  we  use  OMB's  projections of  federal 
income  tax revenues.  State and  local income  taxes for 1993 through 2030  are 
projected using OMB's  GDP  forecast and assuming that the same  ratio of  state 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmand local income taxes to GDP prevails between 1993 and 2030 as prevailed in 
1993. 
Aggregate labor income taxes in each year are calculated as the product of 
total federal,  state,  and local income taxes and labor's  share of national 
income.  We distribute aggregate labor income taxes based on the CPS profiles 
of labor income described above.  After 2030 we assume that age- and sex- 
specific values of labor income taxes keep pace with productivity growth. 
Pavroll Taxes 
The NIPA reports aggregate values of payroll taxes from 1960 through 1993. 
The OMB provided us with projections of aggregate federal payroll taxes from 
1994 through 2030.  Aggregate state and local payroll taxes for 1994 through 
2030 were calculated  based on OMB's  projection of GDP between 1994 and 2030 
and the assumption that the 1993 ratio of state and local payroll taxes to GDP 
prevails through 2030.  Aggregate payroll taxes in the years 1960-2030 are 
distributed by age and sex according to 1963 through 1992 CPS profiles of 
covered earnings (labor earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes). 11 
Age- and sex-specific values of payroll taxes beyond 2030 are assumed to equal 
their 2030 values adjusted for growth. 
Excise and Sales Taxes 
l1  Unfortunately, the data do not permit the calculation  of separate 
profiles for state and local payroll taxes,  which aren't  necessarily subject 
to earnings ceilings.  However,  non-Social Security payroll taxes are a small 
fraction of the total (less than 30 percent),  so the bias associated with 
profiles of earnings covered by Social Security is likely to be quite small. 
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sales-tax  revenues  from  1960 through  1993.  For  the period 1994-2030  we  use 
OMB  projections of  federal excise-  and  sales-tax  revenues.  State and local 
excise-  and  sales-tax  revenues between  1994 and 2030  are calculated using the 
1993 ratio of  these revenues  to GDP  and applying OMB's  GDP  forecasts through. 
2030. 
Relative age-sex  profiles of  excise and  sales taxes were  calculated from  the 
1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and  1987-90  Consumer  Expenditure  Surveys  (CEX). 
Separate profiles were  constructed for tobacco,  alcohol, and property taxes, 
and for all other sales and  excise taxes.  The  1960-61  profiles were  used  for 
years prior to 1966.  The  1972-73  profiles were  used for the years 1967 
through 1978.  The  1984-86  profiles were  used  for the years 1979  through  1986, 
and the 1987-90  profiles were  used for 1987  and beyond.  Age-  and sex-specific 
values of  sales and excise taxes beyond  2030  are assumed  to equal the 2030 
values adjusted for growth. 
Ca~ital  Income  Taxes 
Aggregate  capital income  taxes between  1960  and  2030  are calculated as 
capital's share of  national income,  multiplied by  actual or projected values 
of  aggregate federal,  state, and  local income-tax  revenues.  Relative profiles 
for capital income  taxes come  from  the 1962 and  1983 SCFs.  These profiles are 
based upon weighted  average net worth holdings by  age  and  sex, where  the 
weights applied are SCF  person weights.  This procedure could be  applied only 
to individuals aged  80  or less because  of  the paucity of  data for older indi- 
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smoothed and extrapolated through age 100  using a 4th order polynomial. 
Age- and sex-specific values of capital income taxes after 2030 are assumed to 
equal the 2030 values adjusted for growth. 
Non Human Wealth 
Age- and sex-specific values of nonhuman wealth (NHW) in each year between 
1960 and 1993 are constructed by distributing by age and sex each of these 
years' levels of total private net wealth.  Aggregate private net wealth for 
these years is reported in the FOF.12  The relative profiles of wealth 
holdings by age and sex are calculated by using data from the 1963 and 1983 
SCF.  The 1963 profiles are used for years prior to 1963 and the 1983 profile 
for years after 1983.  The profiles for intermediate years are constructed by 
linearly interpolating between the 1963 and 1983 profiles. 
Determining  -  Averape Consumption bv Age and Sex 
The data used for determining average consumption  by age and sex for the years 
1960-61, 1972-73, 1984-86, and 1987-90 are the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA),  the 1960-61, 1972-73, and 1984-90 Consumer Expenditure 
Surveys (CEX),  and the 1977 and 1987 National Medical Expenditure Surveys 
(NMES).  Aggregate NIPA household consumption expenditure was allocated to 
adults based on four relative profiles of consumption  by age and sex-one  for 
Our aggregates are net of the FOF's  estimate of the value of residen- 
tial structures,  plant,  and equipment owned by nonprofit institutions. 
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one for the years 1987-90. 
To use the 1960-61 CEX,  we first needed to impute particular demographic 
information to households.  The reason is that the 1960-61 CEX provides only 
general information about the ages and sexes of household members other than 
the head and spouse.  Our imputation used a statistical match with the 1960 
Decennial Census.  Specifically,  we sorted the Census data by a set of vari- 
ables that are also available in the CEX.  These include demographic vari- 
ables,  such as the number of children  under age 18 and the ages and sexes of 
the household head and spouse,  household income,  the sex and marital status of 
the head, an urban versus rural indicator, region, and housing tenure.  For 
each 1960-61 CEX household with members other than the head and spouse,  we 
then randomly selected a Census household from the set of Census households 
with the same matching data.  The ages and sexes of the Census household 
members other than the head and spouse were then attributed to the CEX 
household. 
Each of the four relative age-sex consumption profiles was formed in a similar 
manner.  First,  we divided the NIPA consumption  aggregates into 35 separate 
components.  For most of these components,  such as clothing, there are 
corresponding data in the CEX that can be used to distribute the aggregate 
values.  For three other components, imputed rent,  financial services,  and 
expenditures by charitable institutions,  there is no corresponding direct 
measure in the CEX,  but there are other CEX variables (e.g.,  house value in 
the case of imputed rent) that can be used for distribution purposes.  This is 
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we use the NMES to distribute health care. 
The second step in forming age-sex consumption profiles involved benchmarking 
the distribution data to the relevant component of the NIPA consumption 
aggregate.  Take NIPA clothing,  for example.  For this component,  we divided 
NIPA clothing by the total CEX clothing expenditure,  where the total was 
computed using the CEX household weights.  The resulting ratio was used to 
rescale the clothing expenditure of each household in the CEX.  Separate 
rescaling of clothing was done for each of CEX surveys used in the study based 
on the contemporaneous NIPA value of clothing.  This procedure was used to 
rescale the CEX data for each of the NIPA components for which there are also 
direct CEX measures. 
In the case of the NIPA aggregate for imputed rent,  we calculated the ratio of 
NIPA aggregate imputed rent to total CEX reported house values, again 
computing the total using the CEX household weights.  We then multiplied each 
household's reported house value by this ratio to produce a NIPA-benchmarked 
estimate of the household's  imputed rent.  The same procedure was used in the 
case of financial services,  expenditures  by charitable institutions,  clothing 
provided by the military, food produced and consumed on farms,  and net foreign 
remittances except that,  instead of house value,  we used, respectively, 
checking plus saving accounts, charitable contributions,  number of household 
members in the military, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household owned a 
farm and 0 otherwise, and total other consumption. 
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NIPA's five broad components: physician's services,  hospital services,  private 
health insurance,  prescriptions,  and other medical.  Specifically,  we formed 
the ratio of each of these components to the corresponding NMES totals (based 
on the NMES population weights) and then rescaled the NMES data based on these 
ratios.  We used the 1977 NMES for the years 1960 and 1961 as well as 1972 and 
1973,  and the 1987  NMES for the years 1984 through 1990. 
In  the third step,  we allocated our rescaled (NIPA-benchmarked)  actual or 
imputed CEX data to individuals within the CEX household.  (This was not 
necessary for the NMES,  which takes the individual as the unit of observa- 
tion.)  For certain types of expenditures,  the method of allocation was fairly 
clear.  For example,  boys' clothing expenditures was divided evenly among the 
household's male children,  and pipe tobacco was divided evenly among the 
household's adult males.  For other types of expenditures,  we developed 
particular rules.  Housing expenditures,  including imputed rent,  was allocated 
evenly to the head and spouse.  And food,  vacations,  and other not readily 
allocable expenditure items,  were divided evenly among the household's adult 
equivalents,  where each adult was given an equivalency factor of 1 and each 
child under 18  was given a factor that increased linearly from .3  for newborns 
to 1 for 18-year-olds. 
The fourth step entailed using the NIPA-benchmarked NMES data to calculate 
age- and sex-specific weighted average values of each of the five different 
types of health expenditures.  These values were then attributed to individual 
members of the CEX households based on their ages and sexes.  In this step we 
also allocated to individual members of the CEX households,  based on their 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmages and sexes, average values of privately paid educational expenditures. 
These average values were determined by calculating average elementary and 
secondary school expenditures per child age 5 through 18 and average college 
expenditures per person age 18 through 24. 
In the fifth step,  we reallocated all of the CEX children's  expenditures, 
including their imputed health expenditures,  evenly to the head and spouse. 
We then combined these NIPA-benchmarked, CEX actual or imputed data for 
particular years (1960 and 1961,  1972 and 1973,  1984-1986, and 1987-1990) to 
form the ratios of the average value over these years of total expenditures of 
adults (those age 18 and older) of a particular age and sex to that of 40- 
year-old males.  This provided our four age-sex relative consumption profiles. 
We used our four age-sex relative consumption profiles and our age- and sex- 
specific population data to allocate total NIPA consumption over the four 
periods by age and sex.  This procedure may appear to represent an unnecessary 
second round of benchmarking of aggregate NIPA consumption,  but in so doing we 
assure ourselves that our final calculated values of average consumption  by 
age and sex are consistent  with the Census population data used to calculate 
age- and sex-specific values of average remaining lifetime resources.  In 
particular, they avoid under- or overestimates of average age- and sex- 
specific consumption that would arise if the CEX household weights were 
systematically too high or too low. 
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Saving and Spending Rates 
Net National  Government  Household  Household 
Saving  Spending  Consumption  Saving 
Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate 
Period  (Y-C-G )  /Y  (Y-G-C ) /  (Y-G) 




The Growth of Household and Medical Consumption 
Rate of  Rate of 
Household  Medical 
Consumption  Consumption 
Source: Authors'  calculations based on National Income and Product Accounts. 
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Consumption of the Elderly Relative to the Young 
Age 60/Age 20 
Age 70/Age 20 
Age 80/Age 20 
Age 60/Age 30 
Age 70/Age  30 
Age 80/Age 30 
Age 60/Age 40 
Age 70/Age 40 
Age 80/Age 40 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Nonmedical Consumption of the Elderly Relative to the Young 
Age 60/Age  20 
Age 70/Age  20 
Age 80/Age 20 
Age 60/Age  30 
Age 70/Age  30 
Age 80/Age  30 
Age 60/Age 40 
Age 70/Age 40 
Age 80/Age 40 
Source  : ~uthors  ' calculations. 
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Resources  of the Elderly Relative  to the Young  (r = 6  percent) 
Age  60/Age  20 
Age  70/Age  20 
Age  80/Age  20 
Age  60/Age  30 
Age  70/Age  30 
Age  80/Age  30 
Age  60/Age  40 
Age  70/Age  40 
Age  80/Age  40 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Propensities to Consume at Selected Ages and Discount Rates 
r = 3 percent 
r = 6 percent 
r = 9 percent 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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r =  3 percent 
Table 7 
The Impact of the Changing Age-Resource  Distribution 
on the Net National Saving Rate 
resource distribution in period 
r = 6 percent 
r = 9 percent 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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r = 3 percent 
r =  6 percent 
r = 9 percent 
Table 8 
The Impact of Changing Propensities to Consume 
on the Net National Saving Rate 
propensities to consume in period 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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The Impact of Changing Population-Age Distribution 
on the Net National Saving Rate 
population-age  distribution in period 
Period  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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The Impact of the Resources-to-Income  Ratio 
on the Net National Saving Rate 
resources-to-income  ratio in period 
Period  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
r = 3 percent 
r - 6 percent 
r = 9 percent 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Decomposing Changes in R/NNP~ 
1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
r =  3 percent 
r = 6 percent 
r = 9 percent 
a~/~~~=[~~  + NHW +  PW - GA]/NNP where NNP=net national product, R=total 
resources, HW=human wealth, NHW=nonhuman wealth, PW=pension wealth, and 
GA=generational account. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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The Impact of the Rate of Government Spending 
on the Net National Saving Rate 
government spending rate in period 
Period  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Changes in the Net National Saving Rate: 
The Case of No Annuity Insurance (r  = 6  percent) 
Impact of Changing Resource Distributions 
Period 
resource distribution in period 
1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Impact of Changing Consumption Propensities 
propensities to consume in period 
Impact of Changing Resources-to-Income Ratio (R/NNP) 
R/NNP  in  period 
a~ee  footnotes to table 11 for definitions. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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AGE 
SOURCE: AUTHORS' CALCULATIONS. 
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0.7 
0 
18  23  28  33  38  43  48  53  58  63  68  73  78  83 
AGE 
SOURCE: AUTHORS' CALCULATIONS. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFIGURE 6: COHORT PENSION WEALTH PER CAPITA 1 PER CAPITA RESOURCES 
SOURCE: AUTHORS' CALCULATIONS. 
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